Discussions regarding the form that state transfers should take generally focus on the relative effi ciency of transfers in kind vis-à-vis transfers in cash. This article, however, proposes a different approach -to determine the optimal structure of a donation, i.e. its optimal composition. Hence, the problem no longer lies in attempting to fi gure out whether a donation in kind is either more or less effi cient than a donation in cash, but rather, to determine, through various hypotheses relative to the agent's behaviour, the most preferable structure for the donor.
Introduction
Let us suppose that the Government decides to help its citizens ensure their well being, enhance their education or simply help them obtain suffi cient amounts of food to survive. The question could be posed as follows: Is it preferable to supply them with assistance in kind directly (through health facilities, education/training and food), as well as indirectly (through subsidies on these goods and through vouchers), or is it preferable to provide them with a lump sum in cash that they could use to satisfy their needs?
According to the traditional model of the economics of well-being, transfers in cash would help obtain a Pareto-optimal situation, whereas transfers in kind would, in comparison, seem under-optimal.
This result led to numerous developments contesting the superiority of monetary transfers. Two of these arguments have played a crucial role. The fi rst relates to an awareness of the donor's preferences and includes a reversing of the analysis of the benefi ciary's preferences in favour of those of the donor. Within this context, as soon as one deals with the psychology or motives of the donor (Olsen, 1971a; Daly, Giertz, 1972) , the superiority of monetary transfers no longer seems evident. Although transfers in kind do not permit the attainment of a Pareto optimum, they nevertheless permit us to attain a « paternalistic optimum » (Browning, 1981) that could be defi ned 268  PRAGUE ECONOMIC PAPERS, 3, 2009 as the optimum which satisfi es the preferences of the donors but which ignores those of the benefi ciaries. The second argument follows the same reasoning as the Samaritan's dilemma as presented by Buchanan (1975) and refers to the imperfection of information, especially regarding the amount of information available to the donor. If information on preferences were not publicly available to the donor -which is the Governmentthe superiority of monetary transfers over those in kind would disappear (Diamond, Mirrlees, 1978; Dye, Antle, 1986; Harris, Townsend, 1981; Nichols, Zeckhauser, 1982; Roberts, 1984; Toumanoff, 1986; Blackorby, Donaldson, 1988) . Indeed, this could result from the fact that certain individuals would try to claim transfers originally meant for others. If, for instance, the Government decides to compensate those who have been assaulted, it would not be surprising to observe that everyone would then declare himself a victim of assault. Hence, as long as the Government is unable to differentiate between true and false victims, between those who are in real need and the rest of the population, it would no doubt be advantageous to carry out transfers in kind rather than in cash. The question thus becomes one of excluding the fake needy (Jones, Cullis, 1997) .
These arguments, however, focus on the sole question of the comparative effi ciency of transfers in cash and in kind. However, as Garfi nkel notes (1973) , if the donor gains satisfaction from both the amount and nature of the benefi ciary's consumption, the optimal solution would then consist in a combination of transfers in cash and kind. We shall base ourselves on this second problematic. We shall hence not attempt to discuss the comparative effi ciency of various forms of transfers, but rather, shall propose a new dimension to the question through the optimal transfer structure of the donor.
This article introduces three new methodological aspects insofar as Garfi nkel's model is concerned. Firstly, it introduces the parameter of altruism into the donor's preference function. Secondly, the form of the gift cash or kind also determines donor's preferences. We shall make use of the parameter of paternalism to rewrite such preference. Thirdly, we will introduce the parameter of preference of benefi ciary vis-à-vis the gift. But most importantly, one should bear in mind that the donor evaluates his preference regarding the benefi ciary and takes this into account when optimizing his act.
The article shall be structured in the following manner. The following section presents the general model and deduces the fi rst results. The third section focuses on the behaviour and choices of the donor. It permits us to characterize an optimal position for the donor. The fourth section proposes complementary results based on a specifi ed utility function. It illustrates the notion of the gift's optimal structure.
Presentation of the Model
Let us suppose there are two individuals, one an altruistic donor 1, and the other, the benefi ciary of the donor's transfers, 2.
They both possess an initial amount of resources permitting them to consume a unique basket of goods at a unitary price, which would give us the following notations:
C i : i's consumption and R i : the initial resource or endowment of i. E: Proportion of resource held by 2 in relation to 1.
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The philosophy of this model is based upon an altruistic relation between the donor, agent 1, and the benefi ciary, agent 2. One must then distinguish between that which is relative to the maximization of the intrinsic utility for each agent, presented as U i , and the altruistic utility, presented as V i .
The utility of 1 and 2 could thus be defi ned as:

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UU C  and 22 () UU C  s.t. U'>0 and U''<0.
C 1 and C 2 are the consumption of 1 and 2. The donor is considered as altruistic. The term altruistic refers to 1's predisposition to renounce part of his resources in favor of another individual. 1's utility function could then be presented as follows:
Wherein α refers to the 1's degree of altruism with reference to 2. V 2 is the utility function of 2 taking into account by 1 upon completion of the transfer. It could thus be presented as :
Our model presupposes that the benefi ciary is not altruistic towards the donor. In other words, the benefi ciary does not express his gratitude to the donor. This corresponds well to cases such as those where the donor is a government seeking to help the most deprived.
Beyond α, our model highlights two major factors: and . is a parameter of paternalism. Paternalism could be defi ned as 1's sensitivity to the form of the transfer, cash or kind. It could thus be interpreted as the donor's sensitivity to the valorization of his gift. According to the structure of the relations, every paternalist 0 < < 1 is altruistic. However, it is equally possible to be altruistic without being paternalistic. If = 0, then, donor 1 would let 2 choose the use of the donation for himself. In such an event, the structure of the donation would favour a donation in cash, in conformity with the principle of consumer sovereignty. On the other hand, if 0 < < 1 , 1 would then express sensitivity to the structure of the choice, and, in this case, the donation would be in favour of a donation in kind.
Meanwhile, parameter represents the benefi ciary's sensitivity towards the dona/ tion, or, more specifi cally, his preference to donations in kind. Thus, as the value of becomes greater, the depreciation of donations in kind becomes more important for the benefi ciary, which could in turn be translated as an increased preference for donations in cash. Parameter thus implies that a donation in kind does not necessarily have the same value as a donation in cash insofar as the benefi ciary is concerned. The depreciation attached to donations in kind can be regarded as depreciation felt by the benefi ciary upon reception of a donation in kind. This depreciation results in the restriction of his choice over consumption. It can even represent the stigmatization that donations in kind could have on the benefi ciary (Ballet and Razafi mahatolotra 2004) . Meanwhile, in our model is interpreted as disutility for the benefi ciary perceived from the donor point of view.
As such, if the parameter α represents altruism, and represent the donor's paternalism and the consumer's sovereignty respectively. Models would traditionally use one or the other to depict the existence of a paternalistic optimum or of the consumer's sovereignty. However, focus shall be laid, in this article, upon the coexistence of the two in a model, where α plays a specifi c role.
1's altruistic utility could thus be defi ned as 
where T and N represent the total transfer and the volume of the transfer in kind respectively. We suppose that R 1 = 1, the resolution of this maximization problem gives us:
Optimizing V 1 in function of T and M, we have the following propositions : Our model conceives symmetry between the depreciation attached to in kind transfer by the benefi ciary and utility of this transfer for the donor. In that sense, and have opposite effects. Proposition 1 gives us directional effects of the actors behaviour. The next proposition concerns intensities of variation. Based on these intensities, we may develop the idea of effi cient structure of the gift. 
Proposition 2b indicates that paternalistic donor is very sensitive to the risk. If the donor anticipates its in kind transfer induce a strong depreciation for the benefi ciary, i.e. its risk degree is high, then paternalism has a weak effect on the gift. c) Altruism is less sensitive than paternalism to the risk.
Marginal effects of altruism are given by the following relation:
As 0 < α < 1, the fi rst inequality
refl ects the proposition 2c. In another way, in kind transfer is more sensitive to risk anticipation than transfer in cash. Proof: see Annex 2.
Altruism -Paternal Behaviour and Choices
The two propositions that were formulated in the preceding section give us a certain idea about parameters. However, they do not permit us to defi ne an optimal position for the donor. For example, the fi rst assertion in proposition 1 indicates that different values of α gives different altruistic positions. Then, for α 1 > α 2 , the total donation with α 1 is greater than with α 2 . Nevertheless, the position obtained with α 1 is not necessarily better than the position obtained with α 2 . In contrary to Walrasian representation that deals to a unique solution, our model focuses on multiple optimal choices. The benevolent dictator i.e. the paternalistic donor gives the social choice.
In order to characterize the optimal structure of donation, let us defi ne donation effi ciency by the following function:
In this defi nition, the numerator measures difference between utility of the transfer for the benefi ciary and for the donor. If this difference is negative, then the donor obtains a greater utility than the benefi ciary. The denominator measures the loss of welfare or the donor sacrifi ce. This defi nition helps us identify the optimal structure of a donation as seen from the angle of effi ciency for the donor. This implies that the donor compares what he could gain through his donation to what he has to sacrifi ce in making this gift.
Using this defi nition, we obtain the main result in the following theorem:
there exists an optimal position which its effi ciency is exactly a.
Corollary
If , , E are given, then there is a value of α , α opt , ensuring to the donor 1 an effi cient position.
Remark
The donation effi ciency decreases with ratio E.
Proof: See Annex 3
This theorem shows us the donor may achieve a maximal effi cient level for its gift: l. Propositions 1 and 2 give us information about transfer possibilities. The theorem proves the existence of an optimal position. Whatever be the level of donation, the theorem implies that an optimal position is always feasible. Corollary tell us that, knowing parameters , , and E, the donor may achieve an optimal position ensuring donation's effi ciency. Within the framework of our analysis, an optimal position is an optimal structure of the gift from the donor's point of view. This theorem proves the existence of an optimal position, but does not offer an illustration of the structure of this optimal donation. The following section proposes some illustrations from specifi c functions.
Simulations and Illustrations
Let  x x u  . We have for all
The utility function of the donor can be written as
The solutions of fi rst's order equations are : 
Remarks on equations (8) and (9) Solutions are at their maximum since the Jacobian is strictly negative. N = 0 if and only if = 1and = 0 . In this case, the depreciation of the transfer in kind is maximal and the paternalistic degree is minimal. In the others cases,
, , E. These remarks imply that the volume of transfers is not greater than the endowment of the donor. Also, we postulate that the total transfer is higher than the transfer in kind. This assumption excludes incoherent values of parameters for computations.
From equations (7), (8) and (9) we have the following results: Firstly, result 1 illustrates conditions of feasibility for donation. Secondly, result 2 shows donation structure and, thirdly, result 3 represents effi cient position for the donor.
Result 1. Conditions of feasibility for donation
Assertion 1
There is α min such that for all α α min the transfer is not feasible or has no sense. The fi rst assertion is equivalent to:
Assertion 2
There is a maximal value of ratio E max s.t if E E max , any transfer is done. E max indicates that donor does not accept to aid a benefi ciary considered by him as suffi ciently rich, i.e. someone who do not need his benevolence.
 
The preceding equation shows that E max increase with α. Then α represents the do/ nor's tolerance. More a donor is tolerant more he accepts to aid someone with high endowment.
After computing fi rst derivation of E max , we have
More the donor is paternalistic less he accepts to transfer to a rich benefi ciary. The following Graph 2 shows variation of E max with α and , where takes a reasonable value, = 25%. In kind transfer is positively dependant to parameter E whereas cash transfer is positively dependant to the altruistic parameter. For a moderate value of , = 0,2 and for reasonable value of , = 25%, we have the following Graph 3. 
The following Graph 4 shows evolution of proportion of in kind transfers with  and E , if  takes the moderate value α = 0.25 and = 25%. We observe that the maximal value of E is % 4  E . This result ensure that the optimal position is better than the minimal altruism i.e. the optimal position is not necessary a prudential altruism (α min ) . However, if , the disutility of the gift is high, then α opt  α min and prudence is an optimal altruistic position.
The expression of derivatives of the effi ciency function is very complex. We only show few results on effi ciency in the following table. 
Conclusion
The debate on the composition of transfers, their proportion in cash and kind, is based on the effi ciency relative to the different forms. The model developed in this article examines a different topic. It is aimed at fi nding out what is the optimal structure of donations for a paternalistic donor, taking into consideration the behaviour models of both donor and benefi ciary. The model developed herein establishes the proportion of the donation in kind and consequently, its proportion in cash. This model examines not only the very question of the existence and volume of donations, but also the elements that infl uence their structure. As such, if altruism has any infl uence upon these structures, it is no doubt the donor's degree of paternalism and the degree of the benefi ciary's disutility with regard to donations in kind that primarily affect these structures.
Annex 1
Proposition 1a and 1b
Optimization of 1 V by T and N gives,
These two equations involve: 
It is in contradiction with (6) 
Proposition 1c and 1d
Differentiating (3) and (4) by  , 
Proposition 2a
By (8), we can write
Proposition 2b
Equation (7) with (5) 
